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The 2019 Department of Defense (DoD) Arctic Strategy updates the previous 2016 DoD Arctic 
Strategy as requested by Section 1071 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization 
Act for fiscal year (FY) 2019.  This update includes a classified annex. 
Specifically, the 2019 DoD Arctic Strategy updates DoD’s strategic objectives for the Arctic 
region, in light of DoD’s renewed assessment of the evolving Arctic security environment and 
the release of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS).  Anchored in NDS goals and priorities, 
this updated Arctic strategy outlines DoD’s strategic approach for protecting U.S. national 
security interests in the Arctic in an era of strategic competition. 
DoD’s desired end-state for the Arctic is a secure and stable region in which U.S. national 
security interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work 
cooperatively to address shared challenges.  Protecting U.S. national security interests in the 
Arctic will require the Joint Force to sustain its competitive military advantages in the Indo-
Pacific and Europe, identified in the NDS as key regions of strategic competition, and to 
maintain a credible deterrent for the Arctic region.  
DoD must be able to quickly identify threats in the Arctic, respond promptly and effectively to 
those threats, and shape the security environment to mitigate the prospect of those threats in the 
future.  The 2019 DoD Arctic strategy outlines three strategic ways in support of the desired 
Arctic end-state: 
• Building Arctic awareness; 
• Enhancing Arctic operations; and, 






2019 DoD Arctic Strategy 
Introduction 
 This document articulates the Department of Defense’s (DoD) strategy for the Arctic 
region in an era of strategic competition.1  It is informed by the 2017 National Security Strategy 
and anchored in the priorities of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and its focus on 
competition with China and Russia as the principal challenge to long-term U.S. security and 
prosperity.  This strategy supersedes the 2016 DoD Arctic strategy. 
DoD’s desired end-state for the Arctic is a secure and stable region where U.S. national 
interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work cooperatively to 
address shared challenges.  This strategy sets forth DoD’s assessment of the Arctic security 
environment, risks posed to U.S. national security interests, DoD Arctic objectives, and the 
strategic approach by which DoD will achieve these objectives.   
A secure and stable Arctic region benefits the United States and necessitates a rules-
based order, reflecting Arctic nations’ respect for national sovereignty and constructive 
engagement to address shared challenges.  The network of U.S. allies and partners with shared 
national interests in this rules-based order is the United States’ greatest strategic advantage in the 
Arctic region, and thus the cornerstone of DoD’s Arctic strategy.  DoD cooperation with Arctic 
allies and partners strengthens our shared approach to regional security and helps deter strategic 
competitors from seeking to unilaterally change the existing rules-based order.   
NDS goals and priorities guide DoD’s strategic approach to the Arctic.  The Joint Force 
must be able to deter, and if necessary, defeat great power aggression.  DoD must prioritize 
efforts to address the central problem the NDS identifies – i.e., the Joint Force’s eroding 
competitive edge against China and Russia, and the NDS imperative to ensure favorable regional 
balances of power in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.  Developing a more lethal, resilient, agile, and 
ready Joint Force will ensure that our military sustains its competitive advantages, not only for 
these key regions of strategic competition, but globally as well.  Maintaining a credible deterrent 
for the Arctic region requires DoD to understand and shape the Arctic’s geo-strategic landscape 
for future operations and to respond effectively to contingencies in the Arctic region, both 
independently and in cooperation with others.  DoD’s strategic approach seeks to do so by 
implementing three ways in support of the desired Arctic end-state (each described in detail in 
this document):  
• Building Arctic awareness;  
• Enhancing Arctic operations; and  
• Strengthening the rules-based order in the Arctic. 
                                                            
1 This DoD Arctic Strategy uses the definition of the Arctic codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4111. The Arctic means all U.S. 
and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all U.S. territory north and west of the boundary formed by the 
Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, 





Assessment of Arctic Security Environment 
The United States is an Arctic nation.  The Arctic security environment has direct 
implications for U.S. national security interests.  Geographically, the Arctic comprises the 
northern approaches of the United States and represents a potential vector both for attacks on the 
homeland and for U.S. power projection.  Approaches to the Arctic Ocean to both the east and 
west of the United States form strategic corridors for maritime traffic.  Arctic sea routes transit 
through the Bering Strait between the United States and Russia, while the Greenland, Iceland, 
United Kingdom – Norwegian (GIUK-N) gap is a strategic corridor for naval operations between 
the Arctic and the North Atlantic. 
The Arctic region is comprised of the eight nations with sovereign territory in the Arctic,2 
including multiple U.S. allies and partners.  The United States does not recognize any other 
claims to Arctic status by any State other than these eight nations.  The United States maintains 
strong defense relationships with six of the seven other Arctic nations.  Four are NATO Allies: 
Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland), Iceland, and Norway; and two are 
NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partners: Finland and Sweden.  They are highly capable, with 
immense experience in high latitude operational environments. 
The Arctic security environment is complex.  Many positive, cooperative trends endure in 
the region.  At the same time, the region is increasingly uncertain, with a deepening and 
intensifying of certain problematic strategic trends.  Although the immediate prospect of conflict 
in the Arctic is low, these trends could adversely affect U.S. national security interests, promote 
instability, and ultimately degrade security in the region.  Key dynamics include: 
Changing Physical Environment:  The Arctic’s physical environment continues to change, 
including through diminished sea ice coverage, declining snow cover, and melting ice sheets.3  
Temperatures across the Arctic region are increasing more than twice as fast as global average 
temperatures, accompanied by thawing permafrost and loss of sea ice and glacier mass.4   
Diminishing Arctic sea ice is opening new shipping lanes and increasing access to natural 
resources during the summer months.  If the warming trends continue at the current rate, Arctic-
wide sea ice loss may result in nearly ice-free late summers by the 2040s.5  Thawing permafrost, 
compounded by storm surge and coastal erosion, adversely affects infrastructure, including DoD 
installations, and complicates the development of new and resilient DoD infrastructure.  The 
physical effects of the changing Arctic frontier are also causing some local communities to adapt 
                                                            
2 Arctic nations refers to those countries that are members of the Arctic Council: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark 
(including Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. 
3 NOAA. Osborne E., J. Richter-Menge, and M. Jeffries, Executive Summary [in NOAA Arctic Report Card 2018], 
p.2-3. 
4 USGCRP. Hayhoe, K., D.J. Wuebbles, D.R. Easterling, D.W. Fahey, S. Doherty, J. Kossin, W. Sweet, R. Vose and 
M. Wehner, 2018: Our Changing Climate. In Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National 
Climate Assessment, Volume II [Reidmiller, D.R., C.W. Avery, D.R. Easterling, K.E. Kunkel, K.L.M. Lewis, T.K. 
Maycock, and B.C. Steward (eds.)]. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, USA, p.74. 
5 USGCRP. Taylor, P.C., W. Maslowksi, J. Perlwitz, and D.J. Wuebbles, 2017: Arctic changes and their effects on 
Alaska and the rest of the United States. In Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, 
Volume I [Wuebbles, D.J, D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard, D.J. Dokken, B.C. Stewart, and T.K. Maycock (eds.)]. U.S. 





by relocating.  Even so, the Arctic continues to be characterized by harsh conditions, including 
extremes of cold and darkness, which impose specific requirements for operating and sustaining 
Joint Force capabilities in the region. 
Multilateral Cooperation to Address Shared Interests and Challenges:  Arctic nations have 
historically sought to isolate the region from wider geopolitical conflicts.  They continue to 
demonstrate a strong commitment to multilateral cooperation.  Arctic nations have, to date, 
largely respected each other’s sovereign interests in the region, even where these interests 
diverge.  International agreements on scientific research, maritime traffic, and environmental 
issues represent concrete measures to address the challenges associated with human and 
economic activity in this harsh Arctic environment.  In this context, there has to date generally 
been a shared interest in a peaceful and stable region that allows the Arctic nations to realize the 
potential benefits of greater access to the region’s resources.  
Status of Arctic Sea Routes:  Russia and Canada claim the right to regulate Arctic waters in 
excess of the authority permitted under international law.  Russia requires foreign vessels to 
obtain permission, embark Russian ice pilots, and serve under escort of Russian icebreakers 
before entering the Northern Sea Route (NSR).  Russia has also reportedly threatened to use 
force against vessels that fail to abide by Russian regulations.  Canada considers the waters of 
the Northwest Passage to be internal waters, subject to the complete sovereignty of Canada.  
Increasing Military Activity: Russia views itself as a polar great power and is the largest Arctic 
nation by landmass, population, and military presence above the Arctic Circle.  Russia’s 
commercial investments in the Arctic region have been matched by continued defense 
investments and activities that strengthen both its territorial defense and its ability to control the 
NSR.  Russia formed the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command in December 2014 to 
coordinate its renewed emphasis on the Arctic.  Since then, Russia has gradually strengthened its 
presence by creating new Arctic units, refurbishing old airfields and infrastructure in the Arctic, 
and establishing new military bases along its Arctic coastline.  There is also a concerted effort to 
establish a network of air defense and coastal missile systems, early warning radars, rescue 
centers, and a variety of sensors.  China’s operational presence in the Arctic is more limited.  It 
includes China’s icebreaking vessels, the Xuelong and newly-constructed Xuelong 2, and civilian 
research efforts, which could support a strengthened, future Chinese military presence in the 
Arctic Ocean, potentially including deployment of submarines to the region.6 
Attempts to Alter Arctic Governance through Economic Leverage:  Despite having no territorial 
claims in the region, China is seeking a role in Arctic governance.  As part of China’s “One Belt, 
One Road” initiative, it has linked its economic activities in the Arctic to its broader strategic 
objectives, as articulated in its first Arctic policy white paper in January 2018.  China’s stated 
interests in the Arctic are primarily focused on access to natural resources and the opportunities 
offered by the Arctic sea routes for Chinese shipping.  China does not currently have a 
permanent Arctic military presence, but is increasing its presence through economic outreach, 
                                                            






investments in Arctic states’ strategic sectors, and scientific activities.  China maintains research 
stations in Iceland and Norway and has pursued energy development and infrastructure projects 
in Russia, such as the Yamal liquefied natural gas project.  China also continues to seek 
opportunities to invest in dual-use infrastructure in the Arctic.  Despite China’s claim of being a 
“Near Arctic State,” the United States does not recognize any such status. 
U.S. National Security Interests in the Arctic  
The United States has three broad, interlocking sets of national security interests related 
to the Arctic region.  These interests are derived from DoD’s assessment of how U.S. national 
security interests, as defined in the 2017 National Security Strategy,7 apply to the Arctic region. 
They include: 
1) The Arctic as the U.S. homeland:  The United States is an Arctic nation with sovereign 
territory and maritime claims in the region.  Its interests include defending U.S. sovereignty 
and the homeland, including through early warning and missile defense; protecting U.S. 
critical infrastructure; and achieving domain awareness to protect U.S. security interests in 
the region. 
2) The Arctic as a shared region:  The Arctic includes a domain of shared interests whose 
security and stability depend on Arctic nations constructively addressing shared challenges.  
Regional cooperation – built on a bedrock of internationally recognized principles like 
national sovereignty – is in the U.S. interest8 and contributes to a secure and stable Arctic.  
This is strengthened by the U.S.-led alliance and partnership network in the Arctic and by 
maintaining activities in the region in line with international norms. 
3) The Arctic as a potential corridor for strategic competition:  The Arctic is a potential avenue 
for expanded great power competition and aggression spanning between two key regions of 
ongoing competition identified in the NDS — the Indo-Pacific and Europe — and the U.S. 
homeland.  U.S. interests include maintaining flexibility for global power projection, 
including by ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight; and limiting the ability of China 
and Russia to leverage the region as a corridor for competition that advances their strategic 
objectives through malign or coercive behavior. 
Protecting U.S. national security interests in the Arctic requires a holistic approach that 
recognizes the relationship between these three sets of interests.  As DoD examines both the 
United States’ and other nations’ interests and activities in the Arctic, DoD will prioritize risks 
and opportunities at the intersection of these three sets of interests.  Additionally, DoD activities 
to protect U.S. national security interests in the Arctic will be in support of broader whole-of-
government efforts. 
 
                                                            
7 The 2017 National Security Strategy identifies U.S. interests as follows:  protecting the American people, the 
homeland, and American way of life; promoting American prosperity; preserving peace through strength; and 
advancing American influence. 
8 The National Security Strategy refers to the Arctic and affirms that “It is vital to U.S. prosperity and security that 





Risks to U.S. National Security Interests  
Trends in the Arctic security environment present specific risks across the three sets of 
U.S. national security interests: 
Homeland:  The Arctic is strategic terrain as a potential vector for an attack on the U.S. 
homeland.  China and Russia pose discrete and different challenges in their respective theaters, 
but both are also pursuing activities and capabilities in the Arctic that may present risks to the 
homeland.  In addition to the challenge posed by strategic competitors, coastal erosion and 
permafrost thaw pose risks to DoD Arctic installations.  Increased economic activity in the 
Arctic raises the probability of a mass casualty incident in the Arctic where DoD assistance may 
be requested.  Natural disasters or other contingencies, such as an oil spill, may severely affect 
Alaska, requiring DoD support to civil authorities. These events may also inhibit DoD’s ability 
to project power from the homeland. 
Shared Region:  In different ways, Russia and China are challenging the rules-based order in the 
Arctic.  Russia regulates maritime operations in the NSR, contrary to international law, and has 
reportedly threatened to use force against vessels that fail to abide by Russian regulations.  
Russia has generally followed international law and procedure in establishing the limits of its 
extended continental shelf.  Russia could choose to unilaterally establish those limits if the 
procedures prove unfavorable and could utilize its military capabilities in an effort to deny access 
to disputed Arctic waters or resources.  China is attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways 
that may undermine international rules and norms, and there is a risk that its predatory economic 
behavior globally may be repeated in the Arctic.  
Potential Corridor for Strategic Competition:  Developments in the Arctic have the potential to 
directly or indirectly constrain DoD’s ability to flow forces globally, and more broadly to affect 
U.S. strategic objectives related to competition with China and Russia in the Indo-Pacific and 
Europe.  The Arctic remains vulnerable to “strategic spillover” from tensions, competition, or 
conflict arising in these other regions.  
DoD Arctic Objectives   
The 2018 NDS provides the overarching strategic guidance for framing DoD’s Arctic 
Strategy.  The NDS establishes DoD’s goals and priorities for defending the homeland and 
protecting U.S. and allied interests globally by regaining the Joint Force’s competitive military 
edge against China and Russia.  Anchored in this strategic aim and supporting NDS tenets, and 
informed by DoD’s assessment of risks to U.S. national security interests, this strategy sets forth 
the following prioritized DoD objectives for the Arctic region: 
1. Defend the homeland:  The NDS affirms defense of the homeland as the first priority for 
DoD.  The Department must be prepared to defend U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic.  The 
Arctic is also strategic terrain because it constitutes the northern approaches to the United 
States; DoD must defend the homeland against threats emanating from these approaches. 
2. Compete when necessary to maintain favorable regional balances of power:  The Arctic is 
a potential corridor – between the Indo-Pacific and Europe, and the U.S. homeland – for 





activities in the Arctic in order to advance their goals for these regions.  DoD must be 
prepared to protect U.S. national security interests by taking appropriate actions in the Arctic 
as part of maintaining favorable balances of power in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. 
3. Ensure common domains remain free and open:  The Arctic is a shared region comprising 
the territories of the eight circumpolar nations and including the Arctic Ocean.  DoD, in 
partnership with other Federal departments and agencies and our Arctic allies and partners, 
should ensure continued access to the Arctic for legitimate civilian, commercial, and military 
purposes. 
These Arctic objectives are not mutually exclusive; they are interdependent and will need 
to be achieved in concert with one another.  Close collaboration across and between DoD 
components in support of these strategic objectives will ensure consistent implementation of this 
strategy.  Additionally, this prioritization of objectives should not be interpreted to mean that all 
DoD activities, presence, and investments related to a particular objective are a higher priority 
than those related to another objective.  Rather, this framing offers a broad, relative scheme of 
prioritization based on risks to U.S. national security interests, relevance to and consequences for 
NDS priorities, and the mandate of established DoD roles and missions. 
DoD’s Strategic Approach for the Arctic 
DoD’s strategic approach for the Arctic is to protect U.S. national security interests and 
prudently address risks to those interests in ways that uphold the region’s rules-based order, 
without fueling strategic competition. Competitive behavior in the Arctic must not distract from 
or undermine broader NDS priorities; the Department must remain vigilant to how developments 
in the Arctic affects these priorities.  A stable and conflict-free Arctic benefits the United States 
by providing favorable conditions for resource development and economic activity, as well as by 
contributing to upholding the international order and regional cooperation on challenges that 
affect all Arctic nations.  DoD will seek to shape military activity in the Arctic region to avoid 
conflict, while ensuring that the Joint Force is postured and prepared to deter strategic 
competitors from threatening our interests. 
U.S. Allied and Partner Network:  Cooperation with allies and partners is the cornerstone 
of this strategic approach.  U.S. allies and partners share a deep, mutual interest in the existing 
rules-based order.  Our network of allied relationships and capabilities is the United States’ 
greatest strategic advantage in the Arctic region.  Our defense ties extend and amplify the 
credibility of our collective deterrent against shared challenges; enhance our ability to contend 
with strategic competition; and form the basis for a mutual approach to maintaining a secure and 
stable Arctic region.  DoD will pursue a collaborative approach with allies and partners, 
including both Arctic nations and like-minded non-Arctic nations, in working across the ways 
and means identified in this strategy. 
Deterrence in the Arctic:  To ensure a credible deterrent for the Arctic, DoD must be able 
to quickly identify threats in the region, respond promptly and effectively to these threats, and 
shape the security environment to reduce or mitigate the prospects of these threats manifesting in 





Arctic by ensuring the Joint Force has the proficiency to respond to regional contingencies, both 
independently and in cooperation with allies and partners.  The U.S. Arctic deterrent will require 
agile, capable, and expeditionary forces with the ability to flexibly project power into and 
operate within the region, as the Joint Force must be able to do elsewhere globally.  As DoD 
examines the attributes of Joint Force capabilities, posture, operations, and activities necessary 
for deterrence in the Arctic, it will do so in a strategy-driven and resource-informed way.  
Determinations will be made on the basis of U.S. interests, NDS goals and priorities, DoD’s 
Arctic objectives, and emerging threats in the Arctic and other key theaters of competition, rather 
than by a parity-based approach that seeks to approximate competitors’ capabilities and numbers 
of units, systems, or bases.  
Support to other U.S. Department, Agency, and Community Roles:  Other Federal 
departments and agencies play critical roles in protecting U.S. national security interests in the 
Arctic; DoD will work closely with other Federal departments and agencies in support of their 
efforts.  These departments and agencies have lead responsibilities for key aspects of the Arctic 
security environment, including from a diplomatic and homeland security perspective.  DoD will 
work with other Federal departments and agencies by identifying and communicating the effects 
of strategic competitors’ activities, engagements, and interests in the region, and supporting 
wider U.S. Government engagement within Arctic multilateral forums.  DoD will continue to 
coordinate and collaborate with interagency partners on research and development activities to 
build Arctic capabilities through the Interagency Arctic Research and Policy Committee.  DoD 
will also seek to provide support as appropriate to wider U.S. Government responses to 
contingencies in the Arctic, such as natural disasters. 
DoD will also continue to recognize the importance of working with Alaska Natives in 
the Arctic.  DoD engages closely with local communities in Alaska and recognizes their equities 
as part of DoD activities in the region.  DoD has instituted specific programs to ensure regular 
communication with Alaska Natives and to incorporate their views on regional developments 
into DoD activities. 
Arctic Ways & Means  
Implementing the strategic approach described above to advance DoD’s Arctic objectives 
requires three sets of strategy-informed ways: 
• Building Arctic awareness; 
• Enhancing Arctic operations; and 
• Strengthening the rules-based order in the Arctic. 
These strategic ways will inform DoD’s presence, capability, and resourcing priorities in 
the Arctic.  They encompass both activities DoD is undertaking and capability gaps DoD is 
addressing in order to achieve the desired strategic effects in the Arctic.  DoD decisions on 
resourcing in these areas will be made as part of the Department’s Planning Programming, 





Commander U.S. Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) is designated as DoD's 
Arctic Capability Advocate.  This designation recognizes the unique challenges posed by the 
Arctic environment, as well as the Arctic geography which spans across multiple Combatant 
Command’s Areas of Responsibility.  Arctic capabilities advocacy comes in many forms.  In the 
role of DoD Arctic Capability Advocate, CDRUSNORTHCOM will coordinate with other 
Combatant Commands, the Military Departments, and Defense Agencies to ensure that Arctic 
capability gaps are identified and prioritized, and that appropriate means of advocacy are 
emplaced to effectively communicate associated risks. 
Building Arctic Awareness  
DoD’s ability to detect threats in the Arctic is a prerequisite to deterring or responding to 
strategic competitors’ activities in the region.  In order to operate effectively in the Arctic, DoD 
must also maintain the ability to understand its operational environment.    
The Arctic environment presents specific operational challenges that limit 
communications, including the harsh climate, vast distances, and atmospheric phenomena.  Even 
within the Arctic there is considerable variation between the North American Arctic, which has a 
harsher climate, and the milder, Gulf Stream-affected, European Arctic.  The North American 
Arctic also lacks the relatively robust logistics infrastructure of the European Arctic.  Operating 
effectively in the Arctic, therefore, requires DoD to make time-sensitive, risk-informed 
investments to understand and build awareness of the region.   
Enabling domain awareness. Effective surveillance of the northern air and maritime approaches 
to North America is foundational to homeland defense aerospace warning, aerospace control, 
maritime warning, and missile defense.  Cooperation with Canada through the North American 
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is key to the defense of the northern approaches.  To 
detect and track potential airborne threats, including Russian long-range bombers and cruise 
missiles, the United States and Canada rely on radar systems such as the aging North Warning 
System, a network of aerospace surveillance radars in northern Canada and Alaska.  DoD’s 
ability to detect threats and defend North America is challenged by rapidly advancing strategic 
competitors’ capabilities.  Modernizing DoD’s missile and cruise missile defense systems is 
critical to maintaining a layered approach to domain awareness through multi-domain sensors 
that include terrestrial radars and space-based capabilities.  DoD’s current binational study with 
Canada’s Department of National Defence is evaluating potential solutions for modernization of 
sensor coverage of North America to deter, detect, track, and enable defeat of both existing and 
emergent airborne threats to North America, including the threats posed by Russia’s advanced 
cruise missile and hypersonic glide vehicle capabilities.  Among potential Arctic defense 
investments, DoD will prioritize modernization of infrastructure supporting enhanced domain 
awareness.  
Additionally, DoD is enhancing maritime surveillance of the GIUK gap and the North Atlantic 
through cooperation with the United Kingdom and Norway on P-8 aircraft patrols.  This 





Improving communications & Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).  Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, and ISR (C4ISR) are essential to operations in the Arctic, 
but remains challenging above 65 degrees North latitude.  Communications challenges exist as 
atmospheric interference in the form of solar and magnetic phenomena degrades high-frequency 
radio signals.  Satellite-based communications are also limited, further constraining reliable 
voice communication and restricting data coverage in the Arctic region.  
Given this operating environment, there is a need for deployable communications and data 
networks capable of operating in the northern latitudes.  This requires establishing robust and 
dynamic communications architecture with terrestrial, aerial, and space layers that are fully 
integrated and interoperable with mission partners.  Both terrestrial and aerial communications 
equipment must be designed to function in the harsh Arctic weather conditions, which include 
rapid cycles of freezing and thawing and temperatures below minus 60 degrees Fahrenheit.  
Equipment testing must also be conducted in realistic Arctic conditions for sufficient periods of 
time.  Adequate data coverage requires sufficiently ruggedized sensors to be deployed year-
round for longitudinal data-set acquisition. 
Increasing in-situ observations and enhancing environmental modeling.  Understanding and 
predicting the physical environment is critical for meeting mission demands and for ensuring the 
safety of personnel and equipment.  The Arctic operational environment is made more 
challenging by several factors, including sea ice, ocean currents, wind, water and air temperature, 
sea spray and icing conditions, highly variable ionospheric densities, and daylight durations.  
DoD continues to invest in improved predictive capabilities for the Arctic regions that will 
enable more reliable forecasts.  DoD is exploring solutions as the Defense Meteorological 
Satellite Program, a key tool in sensing and weather data collection in support of U.S. military 
operations, reaches its end-of-life. 
Increasing in-situ meteorological, oceanographic, and atmospheric observation data is key.  DoD 
will continue to collaborate with other Federal departments and agencies to advance predictive 
capability.  This involves partnerships with other Federal entities, including the U.S. National Ice 
Center, to support efforts such as the U.S. Interagency Arctic Buoy Program to increase 
observations, and the National Earth System Prediction Capability program, to develop fully 
coupled ocean and atmospheric models that incorporate oceanographic and atmospheric 
parameters, including sea waves and sea ice.   
Supporting the Coast Guard’s Homeland Security Missions. The Coast Guard is the lead agency 
for homeland security in the Arctic.  It has specific responsibilities for establishing and 
maintaining situational awareness across the region.  The Coast Guard’s investments in ice-
breaking ships through the Polar Security Cutter program support Arctic operations for a range 
of mission sets, including homeland security, defense, and search and rescue.9  DoD will 
continue to support this program, as it provides a key capability to ensure interoperability 
between Coast Guard and Navy vessels and to support U.S. presence in the Arctic region.  
                                                            
9 The Coast Guard is recapitalizing its polar icebreaker fleet through the Polar Security Cutter Program to address 





Continued engagement through the National Fleet Board will support close dialogue and 
cooperation between DoD and the Coast Guard on maritime domain awareness, intelligence, and 
strategic planning.  
Enhancing Arctic Operations   
DoD’s ability to provide a combat-credible deterrent for the Arctic region requires 
enhancements in the Joint Force’s flexibility to respond promptly and effectively to 
contingencies in the region. DoD’s emphasis will be on adapting existing capabilities and, where 
necessary, selectively acquiring new capabilities, combined with Arctic-tailored training, 
exercises, and posture refinements.  
Regular exercises and deployments in the Arctic.  DoD will demonstrate and enhance the Joint 
Force’s ability to operate in the Arctic through regular exercises and deployments in the region, 
both independently and with allies and partners.  Some exercises will be conducted within the 
NATO context; others will be bilateral or multilateral.  Exercises with Arctic allies and partners 
enable our ability to deter aggression from strategic competitors, including anti-submarine 
warfare and cold weather and mountainous training.  DoD is also an active participant in 
exercises hosted by other nations, including TRIDENT JUNCTURE, ARCTIC CHALLENGE, 
and COLD RESPONSE Exercises.  
Exercises such as ARCTIC EDGE and BOLD QUEST will enhance the Joint Force’s familiarity 
with, and proficiency operating in, Arctic conditions and will improve joint, as well as Service, 
operations in the region.  The Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex enables training and 
exercising opportunities in Arctic conditions and across domains. 
Recognizing that the Arctic region, and our strategic competitors’ activities, extend beyond the 
responsibility of any single Combatant Command, exercises naturally drive increased 
cooperation between geographic Combatant Commands across Areas Of Responsibility, as well 
as between geographic and functional Combatant Commands.  The Joint Staff-led Globally 
Integrated Exercise construct supports enhanced coordination of Arctic-related exercises and 
exercise objectives.  
Cold Weather Training. Operating in extreme cold weather conditions (exceeding minus 60 
degrees Fahrenheit) requires specific tactics, techniques, and procedures.  Toward this purpose, 
DoD will build on existing cold weather training for other operating environments.  The 
Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC) at Fort Wainwright, Alaska provides cold weather 
and mountain training, while Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska hosts the Arctic Survival Training 
School which is the Air Force’s oldest survival school.  DoD will continue to assess cold weather 
training needs to prepare its forces for Arctic operations, particularly for joint operations.  
Additionally, DoD will work to ensure that forces deployed within Arctic areas of operation 
employ ground mobility assets capable of sustained operations in extreme cold weather, across 





Cold weather training is also conducted in cooperation with Arctic allies and partners.  The 
rotations of U.S. Marines through the North Atlantic region include combined training involving 
mountainous assault exercises and cold weather survival. 
Refining Arctic posture.  The Arctic offers an alternative vector for U.S. power projection and 
maneuver as part of DoD operations in other regions.  DoD will maintain access to the Arctic to 
support the global mobility and projection of U.S. military forces.  The forward deployment and 
pre-positioning of U.S. equipment and supplies in Arctic allied and partner nations supports the 
Joint Force’s ability to quickly respond to contingencies in the region.  The Department will 
assess the needs, costs/risks, and benefits of targeted investments to modestly enhance existing, 
regional infrastructure, both in Alaska and in Europe, to enable operational flexibility to project 
forces into the region on an expeditionary basis.  In this continued assessment of potential 
infrastructure development needs in the Arctic, DoD will take into account the long lead times 
and logistical challenges arising from the extreme weather and environmental conditions.  DoD 
investments in infrastructure will complement Arctic allied and partner investments, as they host 
U.S. and other like-minded nations’ forces. 
Supporting resilient infrastructure.  Critical infrastructure supports the Joint Force’s ability to 
flow forces from the homeland and project power globally.  DoD will seek to enhance the 
resilience of critical infrastructure in the Arctic region by coordinating with other Federal 
departments and agencies and the private sector to protect against asymmetric attacks.  The 
Department will also continue to take steps to build the resilience of infrastructure in the face of 
environmental hazards, including through research on permafrost effects to infrastructure.  
Predicting where permafrost thaw will occur is vital to maintaining Arctic training operations 
and assessing impending environmental management challenges.  Continued DoD research, 
development, testing and evaluation will support efforts to build the resilience of Arctic 
infrastructure in the face of environmental hazards.  
Working with other Federal Departments and Agencies on Civil Contingency Responses.  The 
demand for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) activities is likely to grow with 
increased economic activity and enduring geological and environmental risks in the Arctic, 
including demand for responses to possible mass casualty incidents and natural disasters.  DoD is 
responsible for the coordination of aeronautical search and rescue for the Elmendorf search and 
rescue region and works closely in support of the Coast Guard, the lead Federal agency for 
maritime search and rescue.  DoD does not shape or size the Joint Force for DSCA activities, but 
will enhance cooperation with relevant State and Federal departments and agencies in order to 
improve DoD’s effective, coordinated responses to such contingencies. 
Strengthening the Rules-Based Order in the Arctic  
 DoD will continue to work with allies and partners to strengthen the existing, 
international rules-based order in the Arctic.  Sustaining and strengthening the rules-based order 
will help to both deter strategic competitors from specific, aggressive acts and from unilaterally 





with allies and partners to strengthen regional security and will support enhanced U.S. 
Government participation and cooperation in Arctic forums. 
Cooperating with allies and partners to deter aggression.  DoD will work with Arctic allies and 
partners to improve our collective deterrent and ability to respond to contingencies in the Arctic.  
This will include continued efforts to enhance our shared situational awareness of the Arctic 
security environment through strategic dialogues and information sharing, as well as further 
developing a common understanding of our activities in, and approaches to, the region.  The 
DoD will strengthen this cooperation through senior leader visits and bilateral meetings, regular 
defense engagement forums such as the U.S. European Command-led military-to-military Staff 
Talks and Policy-led Bilateral Study Groups and Strategic Dialogues, and implementation of 
bilateral roadmaps and statements of intent.  Frequent U.S. participation in Nordic Defense 
Cooperation-led and Northern Group-led forums, in addition to the Arctic Security Forces 
Roundtable, will help build a shared approach to challenges in the Arctic.  Beyond diplomatic 
forums, Arctic allies and partners are highly capable, with experience and proficiency in Arctic 
conditions that will benefit the Joint Force.  DoD will also seek to enhance cooperation through 
combined training and exercises, both in the United States and elsewhere in the region.  
DoD’s cooperation within NATO uniquely contributes to Arctic security and deters strategic 
competitors from using the Arctic as a corridor for expanded competition enabling their 
objectives in other regions.  The principle of collective defense enshrined in Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty applies to NATO members located in the Arctic, and thus helps deter 
aggression.  Arctic allies and partners are active participants in NATO activities; NATO 
exercises in the High North, such as Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE, offer opportunities to 
improve interoperability in harsh climactic conditions.  The establishment of Joint Force 
Command Norfolk in 2018 as an operational-level warfighting headquarters supports the 
protection of sea lines of communication and allied reinforcement across the North Atlantic.  
These initiatives strengthen the United States’ and allies’ collective defense and address potential 
maritime challenges arising from the projection of power from the Arctic through the GIUK-N 
gap. 
Preserving Freedom of the Seas.  Maintaining freedoms of navigation and overflight are critical 
to ensuring that the Arctic remains a free and open domain and that U.S. forces retain the global 
mobility guaranteed under international law.  DoD will continue to fly, sail, and operate 
wherever international law allows.  When necessary and appropriate, the United States will 
challenge excessive maritime claims in the Arctic to preserve the rules-based international order 
and the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight, as well 
as for other, related high seas uses.  
Conclusion  
 Within the context of NDS implementation more broadly, DoD will continue to prepare 
and posture the Joint Force to ensure that the Arctic is a secure and stable region where U.S. 
national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work 
cooperatively to address shared challenges.  This strategy outlines a Departmental approach and 





region, while also prioritizing a continued, cooperative approach to maintaining the existing 






Annex A: Service Roles and Missions in the Arctic 
  
Each Military Department plays a critical role in achieving objectives and approach 
outlined in this Arctic strategy.  
Air Force 
The Air Force operates the majority of DoD’s assets in the Arctic.  The Air Force’s 
activities support international norms of access and navigation to ensure adequate protection of 
U.S. national security interests in the region.   
Air and space assets are especially crucial for the Arctic region due to its vast distances 
and minimal land and maritime infrastructure.  Air Force mission sets in the Arctic range from 
missile defense and power projection to space situational awareness and search and 
rescue.   Vital early warning decision space for homeland defense is provided by the Alaska 
Radar System and more than 50 radars that comprise the North Warning System across 
Canada.  Assets at Clear, Alaska, and Thule, Greenland, are uniquely positioned for supporting 
space surveillance and satellite control networks, tracking tens of thousands of objects in orbit 
daily.      
The Air Force maintains several large air bases supporting Arctic operations, including 
those at Elmendorf Air Force Base (AFB) and Eielson AFB in Alaska.  Alaska offers key 
strategic locations for projecting airpower into the Indo-Pacific and Europe.  These Alaskan 
bases support critical advanced generation fighter aircraft, including the F-35, and aerial 
refueling tankers from a strategic forward location offering global reach.  The New York Air 
National Guard operates unique ski-equipped aircraft that provide access to some of the most 
remote locations on the Greenland ice sheet.  The Alaska Air National Guard’s Rescue 
Coordination Center works closely with the Coast Guard to perform hundreds of search and 
rescue missions annually.   
The Air Force contributes to essential training events focused on Arctic readiness, 
including operating Air Force’s oldest survival school at Eielson AFB, Alaska.  Finally, the Air 
Force executes Exercise RED FLAG Alaska and contributes to the Joint Pacific Alaska Range 
Complex, DoD’s largest airspace, at 65,000 square miles, optimized for high-end training against 
strategic competitors.   
In addition to these key, existing assets and posture, the Air Force continues to explore 
opportunities to modernize and enhance Arctic capabilities.   
Navy 
The Arctic region is uniquely relevant to the Navy’s ability to provide flexible deterrent 
options.  The Arctic provides additional maneuver room for distributed nuclear and conventional 
force deterrent operations.  The Navy’s 2nd Fleet has responsibility for ensuring the readiness of, 





fight across multiple domains, thereby deterring aggression.  Commander, U.S. 2nd Fleet is dual-
hatted as Commander of NATO’s Joint Force Command Norfolk.  
The Navy will be ready to exercise, maintain, and exploit Sea Control in order to defend 
U.S. maritime access and interests in the Arctic.  Naval forces provide maritime security in the 
maritime domain and the seaborne approaches to the United States, including the Arctic.  
Maritime security in the Arctic includes defending sea lines of communication and the homeland 
from seaborne attacks, maritime domain awareness, and supporting Coast Guard operations as 
required.  The Navy builds interoperability with the Coast Guard through the National Fleet Plan 
and the associated National Fleet Board.  Regular meetings of the Coast Guard-Navy National 
Fleet Board Arctic Working Group address cooperation and maritime security operations in the 
Arctic.  The Navy also ensures access to the Arctic through routine deployments of submarines 
and aircraft to the region. 
The Arctic enables sea-based power projection (e.g., precision fires from ships, 
submarines, carrier-based aircraft, and Marines Corps operations) from vectors outside of 
traditional operating areas.  The Navy conducts the biennial ICEX submarine exercise north of 
Alaska’s North Slope. This is a multi-national submarine exercise that enhances readiness for 
sustained Arctic operations. 
Through its sealift operations, the Navy provides timely movement, positioning, and 
sustainment of the Joint Force across the range of military operations, including the movement of 
personnel, material, and forces to and from or within the Arctic, by sea.  
The Navy will provide support as required to Arctic search and rescue missions 
conducted and led by the Coast Guard, and as directed in support of international partners. 
As part of its DSCA and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief responsibilities, the 
Navy will remain ready to support Arctic operations, such as: pollution response and natural 
disaster recovery; integrated planning efforts with local, State, Federal, and native communities; 
and interoperability with the Coast Guard and international partners. 
Marine Corps 
The Marine Corps maintains capability to support Naval operations in "any clime and 
place," including the Arctic.  Depending on seaborne lift, the Service plans for a baseline of two 
Marine Expeditionary Brigades that can conduct offensive operations in extreme cold weather 
environments. 
To develop and maintain this capability, the Marine Corps routinely deploys Marine Air-
Ground Task Forces of varying sizes to conduct cold weather training. The units train at the 
Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, and other venues, including Camp Ripley, 
Minnesota and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.  The Service also trains in Alaska, in Exercise ARCTIC 
EDGE, and in Norway, in exercises such as TRIDENT JUNCTURE, as well as through winter 
training rotations above the Arctic Circle.  These training exercises feature interoperability 





Corps conducts cold weather training in the Pacific, including in the Korea Marine Exercise 
Program, and in northern Japan, in winter exercises such as FOREST LIGHT. 
The Marine Corps has recently upgraded its Infantry Combat Clothing and Equipment 
(ICCE) cold weather inventory.  The Service maintains sufficient cold weather ICCE for the 
entire active and reserve population and Extreme Cold Weather Clothing System (ECCWCS) 
ICCE (sufficient for temperatures to minus 25 degrees Fahrenheit) for 35,000 Marines.  The 
resulting ability to outfit 39,000 Marines for extreme cold weather supports the Arctic-capable 
two MEB objective. 
Army 
On order, U.S. Army Alaska (USARAK) executes Joint Forces Land Component 
Commander functions in support of United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) operations and 
USNORTHCOM Homeland Defense and DSCA missions in Alaska.  Army forces are postured 
to support mission sets through the USNORTHCOM-defined Alaska Joint Operations Area, as 
well as worldwide unified land operations in support of USARPAC. 
Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Command mans and 
operates Ground-Based Interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, to defend the U.S. homeland from 
long-range ballistic missile attacks.  
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Engineering (USACE) Research and Development 
Center, Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (ERDC-CRREL) works to enhance 
Arctic domain awareness by examining the effects of a changing climate; and by monitoring 
Arctic effects on the operational environment, including sensor performance and signal 
propagation.  The USACE ERDC-CRREL addresses effects on infrastructure and operations 
resulting from exposure to extreme environmental and dynamic climactic conditions.  USACE 
ERDC-CRREL is pursuing technology to detect permafrost conditions, providing facilities to 
simulate Arctic conditions, as well as systems and materials evaluation and development.   
The U.S. Army Cold Regions Test Center, located at Fort Greely, Alaska, plans and 
conducts developmental testing, with an emphasis on Soldier participation, in the snow, extreme 
cold, and sub-arctic natural environment.  This provides acquisition and Army leadership with 
timely, accurate, and relevant information relating to system performance.  
USARAK manages Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex training areas and airspace in 
and around Eielson Air Force Base and Fort Greely. 
Special Operations Forces 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) routinely participate in Arctic or near-Arctic region 
exercises (e.g., BOLD QUEST, NORTHERN GRIFFIN, TRIDENT JUNCTURE) to ensure 
interoperability with allies and partners.  
The agile and expeditionary nature of SOF, combined with established allied and partner 
relations and interoperability, provides DoD a ready capability to compete below the level of 






The National Guard, through the Army or the Air Force, provides forces that may be 
made available to support DoD’s missions in the Arctic region. 
The National Guard operates in both Federal and State capacities in the Arctic, 
contributing to a spectrum of DoD missions.  In a Federal duty status, the National Guard 
provides ready forces available for mobilization as part of defense of the homeland or abroad, as 
well as for conducting DSCA missions.  Drawing on forces located in Alaska and other regions, 
the National Guard augments Title 10 DoD forces, including in such missions as ballistic missile 
defense.  The National Guard also contributes to DoD’s air mobility in the Arctic and leads the 
only U.S. LC-130 Wing capable of operating C-130s from ice locations in the Arctic. 
In Title 32 and State duty status, the National Guard undertakes Disaster Response, 
Domain Awareness, Arctic Search and Rescue, Homeland Defense, and Environment Protection 
missions.  The National Guard’s performance of these roles in Alaska builds operational 
proficiency in extreme climactic conditions and helps address some of the challenges posed by 
the changing physical environment.  In addition, in Alaska the National Guard leads the Alaska 
Native Tribal liaison, supporting engagement with local indigenous communities. 
In a State duty status, the National Guard has conducted international engagement with 
Arctic allies and partners, including planning and coordination activities related to disaster 
response and civil support.  The National Guard Arctic Interests Council focuses and 
synchronizes interstate Arctic interests and expertise. 
 
 
